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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of writing the book, Disabled Education,1 I read 
about 100 hearing officer decisions in five different jurisdictions that 
were resolved under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).2  California was one of those jurisdictions.  In this paper, I 
will generally discuss the trends that I found in each of those 
jurisdictions and reflect on how the California hearing officer 
decisions compared to decisions rendered in the other jurisdictions 
(New Jersey, Florida, Ohio, and the District of Columbia). 
Although I will report overall win-loss rates before hearing 
officers in the following paragraph, one should be cautious about 
drawing conclusions from win-loss rates.3  Even if plaintiffs prevail 
one hundred percent of the time, it is impossible to know what results 
were reached in cases that were settled.  Similarly, if plaintiffs 
always lose, it is impossible to know if that is because they only 
choose to litigate truly weak cases and settle many strong cases with 
quite favorable results.  Because the IDEA encourages alternative 
dispute resolution,4 it is especially difficult to know what to conclude 
by looking exclusively at litigated cases.  Nonetheless, settlement 
                                                          
* Distinguished University Professor & Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in 
Constitutional Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.  
I would like to thank Patrick Noonan for collecting the California decisions and 
thank then-Moritz Librarian Stephanie Ziegler for helping me find innumerable 
sources during this research.  I would also like to thank Julie Waterstone, Paul 
Grossman, Joe Tulman, and the participants at the Pepperdine Law School Special 
Education Conference for providing helpful feedback. 
 
1 RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (forthcoming 2013). 
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).  Under the IDEA, a parent can file a 
complaint with the State educational agency if he or she believes the school district 
is not complying with the IDEA.  Id. § 1415.  If the dispute cannot be resolved 
voluntarily through a resolution session or mediation then a state-level hearing 
officer resolves it.  See id. (procedural safeguards). 
3 For discussion of some of the factors that should cause one to be 
cautious in interpreting win-loss rates, see Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001); Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 99 (1999). 
4 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e), (f)(1)(B) (2012). 
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occurs under the shadow of the law.  If parents perceive that they are 
likely to be able to win at a due process hearing, then they might be 
more willing to hold out for a highly favorable settlement than if they 
understand that parents virtually never win.  Because hearing officer 
decisions, but not settlements, are public records, one must expect 
that hearing officer decisions influence the content of settlements.  
This factor is especially salient in California because hearing officers 
also serve as mediators (in cases in which they are not the hearing 
officer) and might use the technique of “reality check” to help 
resolve disputes in ways that reflect decisions they have rendered in 
similar matters.  Further, California has the most user-friendly 
hearing officer database in the country,5 making it especially easy for 
litigants to follow its decisions. 
The overall win/loss rate in California is typical of the other 
jurisdictions I examined in a broad, global sense, but with the caveat 
that the parent victories were often partial in California.  I 
categorized a case as “pro-parent” if the parent prevailed on any 
ground; it was typical for parents to prevail on only one out of many 
claims in California so these “victories” are often quite partial.  
Parents or guardians prevailed, at least in part, in 35 of 101 cases 
(34.6%) in California decided between May 3, 2010 and June 20, 
2011.  Parents prevailed in 32.7% of cases that went to the merits in 
Ohio, 15.1% of cases in Florida (but with a very high rate of 
voluntary resolution), 5.4% of regular petitions in New Jersey, 17.2% 
of emergent relief petitions in New Jersey, and 57% of cases in the 
District of Columbia.6  Other than the D.C. decisions, I therefore 
found that the hearing officer decisions were disproportionately pro-
school district.  The burden of proof placed on parents often made it 
difficult for them to prevail even when it appeared they had some 
strong arguments.  I argue in Part II that these hearing officers are 
often placing a higher burden of proof on parents than contemplated 
by the Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast.7 
                                                          
5 See Special Education Decisions & Orders, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www.dgs.ca.gov/oah/SpecialEducation/searchDO.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 
2013). 
6 For further discussion, see RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION 109–
216 (forthcoming 2013). 
7 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
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The Supreme Court in Schaffer expected that certain 
conditions of fairness would be present when it allocated the burden 
of proof on parents.  Specifically, it anticipated that parents would 
have full access to records and reports to counter the school district’s 
“firepower.”8  It also expected hearing officers to conduct hearings 
flexibly so that parents who were not represented by a lawyer or did 
not speak English would be able to prevail.9  In Part II, I argue that 
some California decisions do not seem consistent with those fairness 
considerations.  Of the twenty California cases in which a lawyer did 
not represent parents, the parents prevailed in only one case.10  Of the 
seven cases involving use of a foreign language interpreter, only one 
parent prevailed.11  Greater attention to issues of fairness might cause 
parents to have a higher success rate. 
Parents in California have particular difficulty prevailing 
when they seek to argue that the school district’s proposed 
educational program is inadequate.  This issue is governed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Rowley12 and will 
be discussed in Part III.  Part III will also focus on the decision in J.L. 
v. Mercer Island School District,13 which sets the standard for courts 
to follow in the Ninth Circuit in these kinds of cases.  By examining 
the factual record and appellate ruling closely in both Rowley and 
Mercer Island, I argue that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth 
Circuit intended to impose an overly difficult burden of proof on 
parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of educational programs. 
                                                          
8 Id. at 61. 
9 “IDEA hearings are deliberately informal and intended to give ALJs the 
flexibility that they need to ensure that each side can fairly present its evidence.  
IDEA, in fact, requires state authorities to organize hearings in a way that 
guarantees parents and children [IDEA’s] procedural protections.”  Id. 
10 See Parent ex rel. Student v. Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., No. 
2010100854 (OAH Cal. Apr. 8, 2011) (June R. Lehrman, ALJ), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100854.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013). 
11 See Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Parents ex rel. Student, OAH 
Case No. 2010060472 (Dec. 27, 2010) (Robert F. Helfand, ALJ), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010060472.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013). 
12 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
13 575 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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The final hurdle faced by parents in California is the difficulty 
of persuading the hearing officer to order a remedy when a 
procedural violation has occurred.14  In Part IV, I discuss the legal 
standard that applies to these cases and describe some California 
district court cases that have concluded that a remedy is appropriate 
for a procedural violation.  In some of these cases, the district court 
overruled the hearing officer to order a remedy.  Hearing officers 
often interpret their authority too narrowly in determining whether to 
order a remedy when a procedural error has occurred. 
As this article will reflect, California is a jurisdiction that is 
ripe for extensive analysis because its decisions are readily available 
in a word-searchable database.  It also has a fairly high number of 
cases decided on an annual basis so that meaningful conclusions can 
be drawn from the cases.  It would be helpful if other states offered 
such transparency in their special education decisions so that we 
could have a more accurate picture of the national landscape in the 
field of special education law. 
   
II.   BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
A.   Schaffer v. Weast 
 
The rules regarding burden of proof derive from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast.15  The Court noted that the 
term “burden of proof” encompasses two burdens—the burden of 
persuasion (i.e., who loses if the evidence is closely balanced) and 
the burden of production (i.e., the obligation to come forward with 
evidence at different points in the proceeding).16  The Schaffer case 
only involved the “burden of persuasion” aspect of the burden of 
proof—who wins if the evidence is closely balanced.  The Court held 
that the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing 
challenging an individual education program (IEP) is placed upon the 
party seeking relief.17 
                                                          
14 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). 
15 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
16 Id. at 56. 
17 Id. at 62. 
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The Court acknowledged that the rule usually placed the 
burden of persuasion on the parent but also noted it could be on the 
school district when it is the moving party seeking “to change an 
existing IEP . . . or if parents refuse to allow their child to be 
evaluated.”18  In my sample of 101 California decisions, there were 
twenty-six cases where the school district bore the burden of proof.19  
Parents only prevailed in three of those cases (11.5 %), an even lower 
success rate than when parents had the burden of proof.20  Those 
numbers do not necessarily mean that the hearing officer was 
incorrectly allocating the burden of proof but they do suggest that 
close examination of whether hearing officers are truly imposing the 
burden of proof on school districts in those cases is warranted.  A 
close examination of the Schaffer decision provides a basis for 
arguing that California hearing officers are often making it too 
difficult for parents to prevail in special education cases, because 
they are not applying the fairness considerations emphasized by the 
Schaffer Court.   
The Schaffer case involved a seventh grade boy, Brian 
Schaffer, who had attended a private school from prekindergarten to 
seventh grade.21  When the private school concluded that it could no 
longer offer Brian an appropriate education, his parents contacted the 
local public school district to have Brian classified as disabled and to 
receive an education funded by the school district.22  The parents and 
the school district agreed that Brian was disabled but could not agree 
on the content of his IEP.23  The school district proposed one of two 
public school placements; his parents insisted that the only 
appropriate placement was another private school.24  Their 
disagreement involved the issue of what should be the content of the 
first IEP drafted by the school district in consultation with Brian’s 
                                                          
18 Id. at 53. 
19 See COLKER, supra note 6. 
20 Id. 
21 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54.  See generally Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 
2d 538 (D. Md. 2000) (appeal from Administrative Law Judge decision in Schaffer 
v. Weast). 
22 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54–55. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 55. 
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parents.25  When the parties could not come to an agreement, Brian’s 
parents initiated a due process hearing challenging the school 
district’s proposed IEP and seeking reimbursement for unilaterally 
sending Brian to a private school.26 
At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) held that 
the parents bore the burden of proof and, in a close case, ruled in 
favor of the school district.27  On appeal, the district court reversed 
and remanded, holding that the burden of proof should have been 
placed on the school district.28  On remand, the hearing officer ruled 
in favor of the parents, concluding that the burden of proof was 
dispositive to the outcome of the case.29  Ultimately, the Fourth 
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court ruled that the district 
court was wrong to conclude that the burden of proof was on the 
school district in this kind of case.30  Because the hearing officer had 
found that the allocation of the burden of proof was dispositive to the 
outcome in this case, the school district prevailed in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.31 
But the more important question from the Schaffer case is the 
following: what did the Court mean by the weight of the burden of 
proof that should be placed on the party seeking relief (in this case, 
the parents), and how does that holding relate to cases being decided 
in California? 
In deciding to allocate the burden of proof on the moving 
party, the Supreme Court emphasized that the statute’s procedural 
safeguards are designed so that parents “are not left to challenge the 
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary 
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the 
opposition.”32  The Court emphasized that “IDEA hearings are 
deliberately informal and intended to give ALJs the flexibility that 
                                                          
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55. 
28 Id. 
29 Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396, 397 n. 2 (D. Md. 2002), rev’d, 
Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004). 
30 See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004); Schaffer v. Weast, 
546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
31 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62. 
32 Id. at 61. 
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they need to ensure that each side can fairly present its evidence.  
IDEA, in fact, requires state authorities to organize hearings in a way 
that guarantees parents and children the procedural protections of the 
Act.”33 
The ALJ should, therefore, conduct the hearing in a way that 
gives the moving party a realistic opportunity to prevail.  One 
particularly important rule is that parents can use record reviews and 
an independent educational evaluation (IEE) to overcome what 
otherwise would be characterized as the school district’s “natural 
advantage” in these cases.  The Schaffer Court emphasized the 
importance of these rules: 
[P]arents have the right to review all records that the 
school possesses in relation to their child.  They also 
have the right to an “independent educational 
evaluation of the[ir] child.”  The regulations clarify 
this entitlement by providing that a “parent has the 
right to an independent educational evaluation at 
public expense if the parent disagrees with an 
evaluation obtained by the public agency.”  IDEA thus 
ensures parents access to an expert who can evaluate 
all the materials that the school must make available, 
and who can give an independent opinion.  They are 
not left to challenge the government without a realistic 
opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or 
without an expert with the firepower to match the 
opposition.34 
The Supreme Court described both record reviews and independent 
educational evaluations as “rights” even though the IDEA provides 
that school districts can contest a parent’s request for an independent 
educational evaluation.35  When parents do not have full access to 
educational records and independent educational evaluations, it is 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 60–61 (citations omitted). 
35 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i) (2012) (providing that a school district 
may refuse to pay for the parent’s independent educational evaluation if it files a 
due process complaint and demonstrates that its evaluation was “appropriate”). 
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possible that the Court does not consider it appropriate to allocate the 
burden of proof on the parent as the moving party. 
Parents in California seem to have difficulty obtaining full 
access to educational records and independent educational 
evaluations.  During the time period that I investigated, the school 
district opposed the parents’ request for an independent educational 
evaluation in nine cases.36  In three of these cases, the parents used a 
Spanish-language interpreter, raising some concerns about the 
parents’ full access to educational records.37  The school district was 
the petitioner in each of those cases and the hearing officer correctly 
allocated the burden of proof on the school district.38  Despite the 
district having the burden of proof, the parents only prevailed in one 
of those cases (11.1%) and, even in that case, the parents did not 
prevail entirely.39  The hearing officer ordered an evaluation at public 
expense in the areas of assistive technology and psycho-education 
but not in the area of speech and language, where the Spanish-
speaking parents had the most concern.40 
Because settlements are rendered under the shadow of the 
law, I suspect that school districts feel emboldened in California to 
challenge IEE requests because of this pattern of prevailing before 
hearing officers at due process hearings, despite having the burden of 
proof.  I wonder if the Schaffer Court would have allocated the 
burden of proof on parents, had the Court known the low likelihood 
of the parents’ success when the school district challenges the 
parents’ request for an IEE, as found in California.  In sum, the 
Schaffer Court emphasized that the IDEA’s procedural protections 
were created to “ensure that the school bears no unique informational 
advantage.”41  The ALJ has the obligation to ensure that the due 
process hearing is held in a sufficiently flexible way to accomplish 
justice.42  Examples of flexibility would include generous application 
of rules regarding access to school records, requests for independent 
                                                          
36 See COLKER, supra note 6, at 183–206. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id.  See also Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 11. 
40 Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 11, at 30. 
41 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. 
42 See id. 
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educational evaluations, and assurance that English-language issues 
are not impairing procedural due process. 
 
B.   Independent Educational Evaluation Example 
 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court presumed that parents 
would have complete access to educational records and an 
independent educational evaluation when it decided to place the 
burden of proof on parents when they challenge an IEP as 
inappropriate.43  One California case highlights the difficulty for 
many parents in obtaining that kind of “firepower.”44 
“Kathleen” Short-Nagel was in first grade when it became 
apparent to her parents and the school district she was struggling in 
school.45  At the end of the school year, on June 3, 2009, the school 
district convened a “Student Study Team” (SST) to discuss her 
difficulties and challenges.46  The team recommended modifications 
and an action plan, including one-on-one assistance.47  The ALJ 
opinion then stated that the action plan was implemented during the 
2010-2011 school year.48  However, the plan should have been 
implemented during the 2009–2010 school year.  The reference to the 
2010-2011 school year was a mistake in the ALJ’s opinion. 
Because of continued difficulties in school, the SST referred 
Kathleen for an initial special education assessment on February 17, 
                                                          
43 See supra text accompanying note 8. 
44 See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Parent ex rel. Student, OAH Case No. 
2010100865 (Feb. 3 2011) (Eileen M. Cohn, ALJ), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100865.Appellate%20
History.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013), rev’d sub nom, K.S.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. 
Dist., No. CV 11-3270 CBM (MANx) (Mar. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Short-Nagel 
ALJ Opinion].  See also K.S.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 11-3270 CBM 
(MANx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100865-
%20USDC%20Order%20Reversing%20ALJ's%20Decision.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 
2013) [hereinafter Short-Nagel District Court Opinion]. 
45 Id. at 2.  The opinions do not provide the student’s first name.  To 
humanize the discussion, I have named her “Kathleen.” 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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2010.49  At the time of the assessment, Kathleen was receiving in-
school pullout intervention classes for reading and writing; bi-weekly 
private tutoring funded by her parents; small group, individual, and 
modified instruction and expectations; extended time; preferential 
seating; repetition of directions; and breaking assignments into 
smaller components.50  As a result of the February 17, 2010 meeting 
and Kathleen’s continued difficulties in school, the school district 
agreed to conduct an IDEA eligibility assessment and, if appropriate, 
hold an IEP meeting.51 
The school district assigned its psychologist, Karen Menzie, 
to write the eligibility evaluation.52  She conducted evaluations of 
Kathleen and wrote her report on March 23, 2010.53  The school 
district also asked special education teacher, Barbara Zafran, to 
conduct some evaluations.54  Zafran completed her evaluations on 
March 19, 23, and 24, 2010,55 with two of those testing dates 
occurring after Menzie had written her eligibility evaluation.  Menzie 
concluded that Kathleen qualified as a student with a specific 
learning disability, primarily on the basis of her score on one subtest 
of a visual processing test.56 
The school district held an IEP meeting on April 29, 2010.57  
The topic of the IEP meeting was both the eligibility decision and the 
IEP for Kathleen.58  In California, school districts often combine the 
eligibility and IEP meetings, providing little time for the team to 
write the IEP.  The IEP team considered two possible areas of 
suspected disability (attention deficit disorder and specific learning 
disability) at the April 29, 2010 meeting.59  “The IEP team 
determined that [the] [s]tudent was eligible for special education as a 
pupil with a specific learning disability due to deficits in oral and 
                                                          
49 Id. at 2. 
50 Id. at 6. 
51 Id. at 3. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 3. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 13. 
57 Id. at 15. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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visual processing.”60  Nothing in the ALJ opinion indicated that the 
IEP team approved the IEP at that meeting (or if one was approved at 
all). 
Kathleen’s mother saw the assessment for the first time just 
before the April meeting, and she did not disagree with the adequacy 
of the school district’s assessment at that meeting.  Nonetheless, she 
had increasing concerns that the district did not fully understand the 
nature of her daughter’s visual processing disorder and sought further 
information from the district.  After the district made the odd 
suggestion that she see an eye doctor to learn more about her 
daughter’s neurological, visual processing deficit, she consulted with 
a lawyer about her next appropriate step.  Her lawyer suggested she 
request an IEP meeting and seek a school-funded independent 
educational evaluation.  On September 27, 2010, Kathleen’s mother 
requested an IEP meeting to register her disagreement with the 
assessment report and, immediately thereafter, provided a written 
request for an IEE at the district’s expense.61 
Rather than comply with this request, the district filed a Due 
Process Hearing Request on October 19, 2010 in which it argued that 
Menzie’s assessment was appropriate and, therefore, the district did 
not need to pay for Kathleen’s IEE.62  After a failed, expedited 
mediation attempt, a due process hearing was held.  The ALJ 
decision in the case was not rendered until February 3, 201163 
because a continuance was granted on November 4, 2010 at the 
request of the parents.64  Although Congress specifies that these cases 
be decided quickly,65 in practice, that rule is frequently not followed.  
Kathleen’s parents could not participate in the due process hearing 
until they had retained an expert who could review the school 
district’s evaluation closely.66  The ALJ ruled in favor of the school 
district67 and Kathleen’s parents appealed the ALJ decision to a 
                                                          
60 Id.  
61 See id. at 15. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 26. 
64 Id. at 1. 
65 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012). 
66 See Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 16. 
67 Id. at 25. 
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federal district court.68  The federal district court judge ruled in their 
favor on March 20, 2012, more than a year later.69  The district court 
judge found that the IEE should commence within thirty days of the 
order so that the results of the assessment could be used to formulate 
an IEP for the 2012–2013 school year, when Kathleen would be in 
fifth grade.70 
The school district had the burden of proof at the due process 
hearing to demonstrate that its assessment was adequate.71  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Schaffer, the expectation is that the 
district will pay for the parents’ educational evaluation of their child 
when the parents seek to contest the eligibility classification or the 
adequacy of the IEP, because the parent, who would have the burden 
of proof in such challenges, needs to have the same “firepower” as 
the school district.72 
In this case, like many cases in which the district is not able to 
demonstrate that its evaluation was adequate, the parent retained an 
expert as well as a lawyer (the child’s mother is also licensed to 
practice law in California, although she does not practice in the field 
of special education).  In fact, in every case that I read in which the 
ALJ or the federal judge found the district’s evaluation to be 
inadequate, the parents hired both an expert and a lawyer.73  That 
practice is unfortunate because it turns the IEE process on its head—
parents can only succeed in forcing an objecting district to pay for an 
IEE if the parents pay for the expenses of an expert. 
In order to maintain any semblance of fairness, a parent 
should not be expected to hire an expert to conduct a full psycho-
educational evaluation.  The parents’ expert should merely assist the 
parents in arguing that the district’s evaluation is not adequate in a 
context in which the district, not the parent, has the burden of proof.  
The ALJ, in this case, claimed to place the burden of proof on the 
district but, in reality, seemed to place a heavy burden of proof on the 
parents.  For example, the ALJ considered whether the parents’ 
                                                          
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. at 12. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 20.  
72 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005). 
73 See COLKER, supra note 6, at 183–206. 
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expert had met Kathleen in evaluating the credibility of the parents’ 
expert.74  But whether the parents’ expert had met Kathleen is not 
relevant to the issue of whether the district had conducted an 
appropriate evaluation.  Rather than place the burden of proof on the 
district to show its evaluation was appropriate, the ALJ compared the 
parents’ evaluation with the district’s evaluation and decided which 
was more thorough: 
[The school psychologist’s] report was not perfect.  
However, [her] testimony was honest and she capably 
explained the foundation for her opinion.  When 
weighed against Student’s criticisms, [the school 
psychologist’s] report and testimony were given more 
weight [than Student’s expert] due to her direct 
observation of Student, her reliance upon extensive 
school records, and her demonstrated ability to apply 
her experience and make a reasoned judgment as to 
the source of Student’s deficits.75 
Because the school district had the burden of proof, it should have 
had to demonstrate that its report met the statutory requirements.  
The parents should not even have to use an expert to prevail. 
The ALJ lost sight of the bigger picture—if the parents 
prevailed, then the district would have had to pay the parents’ expert 
to conduct a full and appropriate IEE.  The parents should not have to 
pay to conduct a full evaluation in order for the ALJ to conclude that 
the district did not conduct an appropriate evaluation.  The ALJ’s 
opinion was overturned, in part, by the district court, but the district 
court did not acknowledge the extent to which the ALJ had 
misallocated the burden of proof or that the school district’s 
evaluation was inappropriate.76 
The school district’s evaluation had a tremendous number of 
problems that, cumulatively, made it impossible to know the correct 
eligibility classification, or what kind of program should be put in 
place to assist Kathleen.  I will discuss these problems with reference 
to the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements.  
                                                          
74 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 16. 
75 Id. at 13–14. 
76 See id. 
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1.   Problem One 
 
The school district must provide a copy of the evaluation 
report and the documentation of determination of eligibility at no cost 
to the parent.77  Kathleen’s parents did not receive the report until 
just before the April 29, 2010 IEP meeting.78  Further, when her 
lawyer subpoenaed the entire assessment file, the district’s records 
were found to be missing much of the raw data that formed the 
foundation for the school psychologist’s report, making it impossible 
for the district to demonstrate that it had administered and scored the 
tests correctly.79  Because Zafran, the special education teacher, had 
found one error in reporting one of the scores,80 there was some 
evidence of sloppiness on the district’s part in record keeping.  
Further, the subpoenaed report was different than the one that the 
parents received prior to the April 29, 2010 meeting because of an 
error in Kathleen’s classroom grades.81  The school’s inability to 
produce complete and accurate test results should have been a factor 
in concluding whether their testing was adequate. 
 
2.   Problem Two 
 
Assessments are supposed to be used for the purposes for 
which the assessments or measures are valid and reliable.82  The 
school psychologist administered the TVPS-3 for the purpose of 
determining whether Kathleen had a visual processing deficit.83  Her 
low score on one subpart of this test was the primary basis upon 
which the school psychologist concluded that Kathleen’s problems in 
school were due to a deficit in “visual closure.”84  The parents’ expert 
testified that the TVPS-3 is not considered to be a reliable assessment 
                                                          
77 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(2) (2012). 
78 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 14. 
79 Id. at 15. 
80 Id. at 14. 
81 Id.  
82 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(iii) (2012). 
83 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 7. 
84 Id. at 16. 
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tool by the Buros Mental Measurement Yearbook, a reference book 
used by clinical psychologists to confirm the validity and reliability 
of assessment instruments.85  In fact, the review cited by the parents’ 
expert stated that “the use of this instrument beyond research 
purposes cannot be recommended, because of the absence of useful 
reliability and validity information . . . .”86  Specifically, the review 
stated that “[i]nterpretation of individual subtest scores or index 
scores also cannot be recommended, as these scores have not been 
demonstrated to be psychometrically differentiable.”87  Thus, the test 
is overall not considered valid or reliable and, more specifically, it is 
not valid or reliable to use one subscore to draw this type of 
conclusion.  Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded: “based upon her close 
observation of Student during the administration of TVPS-3, Ms. 
Menzie obtained reliable test results.”88  Menzie’s “close 
observation” should not substitute for the requirement to use valid 
and reliable measures especially because the IDEA regulations also 
state that an examiner should “[n]ot use any single measure or 
assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a 
child with a disability . . . .”89  “Close observation” without any 
acceptable diagnostic tool cannot be the sole basis for a disability 
classification.  However, the conclusion that Kathleen had a visual 
perceptual deficit was key to Menzie’s entire report. 
 
3.   Problem Three 
 
Assessments are supposed to be administered in accordance 
with any instructions provided by the producer of the assessments.90  
The school psychologist administered the basic battery of the 
                                                          
85 Id. at 18. 
86 Phillip L. Ackerman, Review of the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills, 3rd 
Edition in Mental Measurements Yearbook with Tests in Print, available at 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=28e2f981-10b1-4501-959e-
85b88d0d1e8b%40sessionmgr104&vid=1&hid=126&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3Q
tbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mmt&AN=TIP18173428 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
87 Id. at 4.  
88 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 24. 
89 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2) (2012).  
90 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(v) (2012).  
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Cognitive Assessment System (CAS).91  This test was supposed to 
measure Kathleen’s utilization of her mental process while she 
focused on a particular stimulus and ignored other stimuli.92  Because 
it was the only test that the district administered that supposedly 
would have provided some data on whether she had attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),93 the test results were quite 
important.  Further, the test instructions insisted that test 
administrators follow the instructions precisely, because any 
alteration could compromise the accuracy of the scores.94  
Nonetheless, the school psychologist showed Kathleen how to cross 
out wrong answers so that she could correct her answers and also 
demonstrated to Kathleen how to complete one type of question.95  
This extra assistance drew into question the reliability of the test 
results because it could have raised her score. 
 
4.   Problem Four 
 
Similarly, the school psychologist failed to follow instructions 
when she administered the BASC-2—a test of social skills.  She 
administered it to Kathleen’s mother over a telephone while 
Kathleen’s mother shopped at a mall, and did not try to administer it 
to Kathleen’s father or grandmother who were important 
caregivers.96  Thus, the test’s administration was contrary to the 
instruction manual’s suggestion to offer it in a “controlled setting.”97 
 
5.   Problem Five 
 
Additionally, a child is supposed to be assessed “in all areas 
related to the suspected disability . . . .”98  Here, there was consistent, 
but overlooked, evidence that Kathleen might have ADHD.  When 
                                                          
91 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 6. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 12. 
94 Id. at 18. 
95 Id. at 12–13. 
96 Id. at 18. 
97 Id. at 19. 
98 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4) (2012). 
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Kathleen’s mother paid for a private evaluation of Kathleen in 
kindergarten, the examiner concluded Kathleen did not meet the 
criteria for ADHD.99  Evidence of Kathleen being “unfocused or 
inattentive” was explained as a visual processing deficit rather than 
ADHD.100  Similarly, the school psychologist overlooked a low 
subscore on the CAS, which was supposed to be reflective of an 
executive dysfunction.101  Instead of interpreting that evidence as a 
suggestion to administer a proper test for ADHD, the school 
psychologist refused to test for ADHD because of the lack of 
“clinically significant indications of attention issues from the BASC-
2 rating scales, or from her observations . . . .”102  But that approach 
puts the cart before the horse.  On the other hand, since the SST had 
considered ADHD to be a possibility,103 Kathleen should have been 
validly assessed.  The haphazard administration of the BASC-2, a test 
not designed to make a proper diagnosis of ADHD, did not meet the 
statutory standard for determining whether Kathleen had ADHD.  
Moreover, even her observational basis was deficient because, as the 
school psychologist admitted, she never visited Kathleen in the 
classroom during a language arts lesson that involved reading 
(Kathleen’s area of academic weakness) to assess her attention and 
behavior.104  In other words, there was no valid observational or 
assessment data in support of her decision not to test for ADHD. 
 
6. District Court Reversal of ALJ Decision 
 
Notwithstanding these and other problems with the school 
psychologist’s report, the ALJ found the differences in opinion 
between the school psychologist and the parents’ expert were based 
on “differences in their respective professional judgment as to the 
conclusions reached from test data, record, and classroom 
                                                          
99 Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 5. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 12. 
104 Id. at 13. 
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observations.  Despite her apparent competence and candor, 
[parents’] expert testimony was not persuasive.”105   
This decision was overturned on appeal, although the district 
court judge did not find that each of the problems discussed above 
demonstrated that the school district’s evaluation was 
inappropriate.106  Possibly, the judge did not issue a broader decision 
because of the limited scope of review available to a district court 
judge.  Although a district court judge is supposed to conduct a “de 
novo review” of the administrative record, a judge is also supposed to 
give “due weight” to the decision of the ALJ.107 
The district court judge agreed with Problem One and found 
“that the missing files weigh in favor of the district funding an 
Independent Educational Evaluation.”108  Further, the judge partially 
agreed with Problem Five and found that the “insufficient classroom 
observation weighs in favor of the district funding an Independent 
Educational Evaluation.”109  In addition, the judge agreed with 
Problem Four and found that “the uncontrolled and distracted nature 
of the BASC-2 interview with Mother . . . weigh[ed] in favor of the 
district funding an Independent Educational Examination.”110  
However, the judge also described the “irregularities” as “not as 
problematic.”111 
The district court judge did not fully agree with Problem Five 
and concluded: “while it appears that the District did evaluate 
Student in all possible areas, there are areas in which the District 
spent an insufficient amount of resources.”112  But, the judge never 
explained how the court evaluated Kathleen in the area of ADHD at 
all because of the faulty administration of the tests inaccurately tested 
for ADHD.  Further, the judge did not discuss Problem Two—the use 
                                                          
105 Id. at 19. 
106 See Short-Nagel District Court Opinion, supra note 44. 
107 See generally Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
108 Short-Nagel District Court Opinion, supra note 44, at 7; see also supra 
Part II.B.1. 
109 Short-Nagel District Court Opinion, supra note 44, at 8; see also supra 
Part II.B.5. 
110 Id. at 9; see also supra Part II.B.4. 
111 Short-Nagel District Court Opinion, supra note 44, at 9. 
112 Id. at 11; see also supra Part II.B.5. 
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of inappropriate testing instruments—because Kathleen’s parents’ 
lawyer did not emphasize that problem on appeal.  Therefore, 
following this decision, the school district may consider it 
appropriate to still administer the TVPS-3 for children with alleged 
visual processing deficits.   
More troubling was the district court judge’s refusal to 
conclude that the ALJ inappropriately allocated the burden of proof 
with the language “weighing” the testimony of each of the experts.113  
Instead, the district court judge interpreted that language to mean that 
the ALJ was merely making a “credibility determination” regarding 
the witnesses.114  This was not a case where a plaintiff and a 
defendant’s experts witnessed a traffic accident and the court was 
trying to figure out who to believe.  Instead, here, the ALJ talked 
about “weighing” the experts’ testimony in the same sentence that 
also criticized the parents’ expert for not meeting Kathleen.115  But, 
the parents’ expert did not suggest that she had met Kathleen or had 
an independent basis for offering an evaluation based on personally-
conducted assessments.  The use of the word “weighing” by the ALJ 
suggested that she expected to hear that kind of direct testimony from 
the parents’ expert rather than confine the case to whether the school 
district had met its obligation to test Kathleen appropriately.116 
Accordingly, the hearing officer placed nearly an impossible 
burden of proof on Kathleen’s parents in order to obtain an 
educational evaluation at public expense.  Kathleen’s mother, a 
lawyer, hired a lawyer to represent her family at the due process 
hearing.  Also, the family hired an expert who conducted an 
extremely thorough review of the school psychologist’s report.117  
Since Kathleen’s family was unable to prevail before the ALJ, they 
appealed the decision to a federal district court judge and won a year 
later.118  Meanwhile, Kathleen, who was in second grade at the 
beginning of this process, would be in fifth grade by the time an IEP 
based on an appropriate evaluation would take place.  An IEE 
                                                          
113 See Short-Nagel District Court Opinion, supra note 44, at 9–10. 
114 Id. at 10. 
115 Id. at 14. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 16. 
118 See id. 
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requirement cannot provide parents equal “firepower” to sue school 
districts if it takes three years to force the school district to pay for 
the IEE.  Further, by refusing to find that the ALJ misallocated the 
burden of proof, the district court did a poor job of preventing this 
problem in the future. 
A proper evaluation is extremely important in an IEP case.  
Kathleen’s health insurance plan would not cover a complete psycho-
educational evaluation, and her parents did not have the 
approximately five thousand dollars that it would cost to hire a 
private consultant to conduct one.  Because of the strength of their 
case and Kathleen’s mother’s relationship to the legal community, 
they could find a lawyer to take their case.  But, what about the other 
children whose parents are not able to secure a lawyer and expert to 
challenge the denial of an IEE?  They will not have equal 
“firepower” if they seek to challenge an IEP.  Without more rulings 
by the ALJ in favor of parents, we can expect California school 
districts to continue to resist IEE requests.  
 
C.   Other Fairness Considerations 
 
The previous example involved a girl from a middle-class 
family; her parents only were able to obtain an IEE at public expense 
by appealing an adverse ALJ decision to a federal district court in a 
multi-year process.  Families from less advantaged circumstances, 
such as those in poverty, or those non-English speakers with less 
education, face much greater difficulties in obtaining an adequate 
education plan.   
The following case reflects the difficulties for children who 
have parents who are poor, do not speak English as their primary 
language, and are disabled.  This case involves an eight-year-old boy, 
“Pedro.”119  Pedro lived with his mother (who was cognitively 
impaired), his infant sister, and grandmother (who was his legal 
guardian).120   
                                                          
119 See Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., OAH Case No. 
2011010405 (May 9, 2011) (Judith L. Pasewark, ALJ), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2011010405.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013).  The opinions do not provide a name for the child; I have named him 
“Pedro” to humanize him. 
120 Id. at 2. 
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His Spanish-speaking grandmother filed a due process 
complaint via an interpreter on January 4, 2011 against the Los 
Angeles Unified School District on Pedro’s behalf.121  An advocate 
for individuals with developmental disabilities accompanied Pedro’s 
grandmother to the one-day hearing, but Pedro’s grandmother was 
not accompanied by a lawyer.122  The advocate was present to serve 
as a witness with regard to Pedro’s mother’s disabilities.  Pedro’s 
mother did not attend the hearing; his grandmother was the 
educational rights holder.123  Like many cases where a lawyer does 
not represent the parent or guardian, the record is somewhat sparse.  
However, the record does suggest that the school district was not 
complying with the IDEA even for issues not raised at the hearing.124  
Moreover, it appears that the hearing officer applied the IDEA 
narrowly to rule in favor of the district.  This case illustrates the need 
for fairness so that the parent or guardian of a child has a reasonable 
chance of prevailing in light of the school district’s greater resources.  
Procedural protections should be fully available to children and their 
parents even if they need to use an interpreter. 
Pedro was born to a mother who was cognitively impaired 
and grew up in a household that included his grandmother (who was 
his legal guardian) and his baby sister, who was born when he was 
about six years old.125  The family was primarily Spanish speaking, 
and Pedro was non-verbal, even at the age of six.126  At the age of 
three, the school district classified Pedro as “developmentally 
delayed,” and he received special education services, which also 
included home to school transportation.127 
                                                          
121 Id. at 1. 
122 Id.  
123 See id. 
124 For example, it is not clear why a child, who the school district says 
can walk safely to a nearby grade school on his own, was placed in a segregated 
educational environment not at his neighborhood school.  The IDEA requires that 
children be placed in the most integrated environment possible.  See generally 20 
U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(5) (2012). 
125 See Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 119, at 
2. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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When Pedro turned six, at the end of kindergarten, he was no 
longer eligible to receive services under the “developmental delay” 
category.128  As a result, the school district completed an assessment 
and prepared a report on June 1, 2009 that placed him in one of the 
school-age categories.129  The report classified Pedro as having a 
Specific Learning Disability and a Speech and Language 
Impairment.130  The school district should have convened an IEP 
meeting within thirty days of the June report to prepare an IEP that 
would have been in effect for first grade.131  The record did not 
indicate on what date the IEP team met to prepare his new IEP, but 
his second annual IEP meeting was held on November 15, 2010.132  
Because IEP meetings are held once a year, presumably, the first 
meeting was held a year ago on November 15, 2009, four months 
later than required under the IDEA and three months after the 
beginning of the school year.  This delay, which was never 
mentioned in the hearing officer’s opinion, suggests that the school 
district did not strictly comply with the law. 
Pedro’s grandmother filed a due process request on January 4, 
2011 because she objected to a change in transportation services 
recommended by the school district.133  The school district wanted to 
change Pedro’s transportation services so that it would transport 
Pedro to Grape Elementary from his local grade school rather than 
from his home.134  His grandmother refused to consent to that change 
because she considered it too difficult and unsafe for Pedro to walk to 
the local grade school without a family member.135  The parties went 
to mediation in February 2011 and failed to come to a resolution of 
                                                          
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 2. 
131 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c) (2012) (“A meeting to develop an IEP for a 
child is conducted within 30 days of a determination that the child needs special 
education and related services . . . .”). 
132 Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 119, at 2. 
133 Id. at 1. 
134 Id. at 2–3. 
135 Id. at 3. 
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the case.136  The record indicated that they agreed to a continuance so 
the case was heard on April 12, 2011 rather than February 18, 
2011.137  The record does not indicate whether the school district 
agreed to a “stay put” order to maintain the service pending the 
outcome of the hearing.  The grandmother did not file a motion for a 
“stay put” order.  Nonetheless, the school district may have 
voluntarily agreed to a “stay put” status quo so that the delay in the 
hearing did not negatively impact Pedro.   
On page two of the decision, the hearing officer stated that 
Pedro was assigned to Grape Elementary School for his special 
education services;  in the contested IEP, the district asked Pedro to 
walk to his local elementary school, 68 Street Elementary School, to 
receive transportation to Grape Elementary.138  However, on page 
three and throughout the rest of the case, the hearing officer 
described the local elementary (where Pedro was asked to walk in 
order to catch the bus to Grape Elementary) as being Compton 
Elementary.139  The hearing officer opinion does not explain this 
discrepancy.  This discrepancy is unfortunate because the identity of 
the elementary school was a very important element in the case.  The 
hearing officer concluded that the local elementary school is only six 
or seven blocks from Pedro’s home.140  Further, the hearing officer 
concluded “there are no hazards on the short walk down residential 
streets to Compton Elementary.”141  The accurate identity of the local 
elementary school was relevant to those conclusions.  More 
importantly, one must wonder how much specific attention the 
hearing officer or school district gave to the dangers of the walk itself 
because the correct address was not clarified in the record.  I looked 
at these various elementary schools on a map, and they are within 
several blocks of an interstate highway in the Watts neighborhood.  
The picture of an easy walk through residential streets may therefore 
be highly inaccurate and is relevant to the question of whether Pedro 
                                                          
136 The statute requires parties to participate in a resolution meeting or a 
mediation.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).  See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.506, 
300.510 (describing time table for those processes). 
137 Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 119, at 1. 
138 Id. at 2. 
139 Id. at 3, 6, 8. 
140 Id. at 3. 
141 Id. at 6. 
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can safely walk to the local elementary school where he would then 
have to wait for a bus.  Did the district really consider Pedro’s safety 
as he walked to school or simply refuse to budge on this issue 
because it was highly confident it could prevail at a due process 
hearing at which it knew the grandmother would proceed pro se? 
This case also reflects an overly rigid interpretation of the 
parents or guardians’ burden of proof.  In Schaffer, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that “IDEA hearings are deliberately informal and 
intended to give ALJs the flexibility that they need to ensure that 
each side can fairly present its evidence.  IDEA, in fact, requires state 
authorities to organize hearings in a way that guarantees parents and 
children the procedural protections of the Act.”142 
In Pedro’s case, the ALJ should have operated the hearing in 
a way that gave the grandmother a realistic opportunity to prevail.  
She was provided with a Spanish-language interpreter143 and given 
the opportunity to present four witnesses.144  Even though her 
witnesses provided extensive evidence that it would be dangerous for 
Pedro to walk to the local elementary school145 (and the school 
district offered no contradictory evidence from anyone who had seen 
him attempt to walk to school), the hearing officer concluded that the 
grandmother had not met her burden of proof.146  Although the 
grandmother was technically allowed to present her evidence, 
nevertheless, the burden of proof was not allocated properly.  She 
should have prevailed because, as the Schaffer Court indicated, she 
had “legitimate grievances.”147 
Pedro’s grandmother offered significant evidence in favor of 
keeping the present level of transportation services.  Pedro’s mother 
had indicated at the IEP meeting that Pedro “has a disregard for 
danger, and tries to cross the street by himself.  When Mother tries to 
correct him or hold his hand, Student hits or bites her, and cries a lot 
on the way home.  As a result, Mother considers Student to be a 
                                                          
142 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005). 
143 Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 119, at 1. 
144 Id. at 2. 
145 Id. at 3. 
146 Id. at 8. 
147 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60. 
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danger to himself and others.”148  An advocate for individuals with 
developmental disabilities, who frequently came to Pedro’s home, 
testified that Pedro throws “tantrums, kicks, screams and bites, while 
indicating he does not want to go to school.”149  Pedro’s maternal 
aunt testified that Pedro “gets very frustrated with change and will 
lose control . . . When Student has to walk, he runs, and Mother 
cannot catch him nor can Grandmother run after him.”150  She also 
testified that the “family is very worried that Student’s behavior at 
home is getting worse.  He is now threatening to kill people.”151  
Pedro’s Grandmother agreed with the other witnesses and testified 
“that the school bus does not always get to Compton Elementary on 
time.  Sometimes she has to wait for the bus.  Other times Student’s 
behavior makes him miss the bus, and she must transport Student to 
Grape Elementary, which is a 10-12 minute ride by the public Metro 
bus.”152 
The school district offered no evidence that contradicted the 
challenges that the family would face in walking Pedro to Compton 
Elementary on a daily basis.  All their witnesses commented on 
Pedro’s behavior after he arrived at school.153  The district offered no 
testimony that disputed the veracity of the Grandmother’s witnesses.  
Pedro’s grandmother, without assistance of counsel, therefore, seems 
to have done a good job putting together four witnesses who testified 
that it would be dangerous for Pedro to walk to Compton Elementary 
to catch a bus to Grape Elementary and that his resistance to change 
posed special dangers to this change in his services.154  But, like 
nearly every other parent or guardian in California who proceeded on 
a pro se basis during my period of investigation, she failed.  With a 
fairer understanding of the burden of proof, especially in cases where 
a school district is trying to change a particular service that it offers, 
parents should sometimes be able to prevail even without the 
assistance of legal counsel. 
                                                          
148 Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 119, at 3. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 4–6. 
154 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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The Schaffer Court, as discussed above, suggested that the 
burden of proof on parents is lighter when a case involves the school 
district trying to change an existing rule or policy.155  While noting 
that Congress did not require a child to be given the parents’ 
preferred educational placement during the pendency of all disputes, 
it recognized that the “stay-put” provision applies when parents 
challenge a school district decision to change an existing rule or 
policy.156  In other words, through the stay-put rule, Congress did 
presume the validity of the parent’s position when the parent was 
seeking to maintain the status quo, like in Pedro’s case.  Thus, 
Congress would not intend for the burden of proof, even if it is 
allocated to the parent, to be very high when the parent is seeking to 
preserve the status quo.  Consistent with Schaffer, the grandmother 
should not have had a significant burden of proof in Pedro’s case.  
Because the district had conceded in the past that such a service was 
appropriate, it should not require much evidence to show that it was 
still appropriate. 
The Schaffer burden of proof rule was premised on a large set 
of assumptions about the procedural fairness found in the IDEA that 
could help parents overcome their information disadvantage.157  
Thus, it is important for hearing officers to use their discretion in a 
sufficiently flexible manner to help attain procedural fairness.  The 
means to allocate the burden of proof on issues such as independent 
educational evaluations and continuation of services can be important 
to that broader sense of procedural fairness.  The Supreme Court 
intended hearing officers to apply burden of proof rules within the 
larger context of providing procedural fairness.  As the previous two 
examples demonstrate, that is not always happening in California. 
 
III.   ROWLEY 
 
A.   General Considerations 
 
The next case that is worthy of careful consideration because 
it is often cited in California hearing officer’s decisions is Board of 
                                                          
155 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
156 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 65 n. 1. 
157 See supra Part II.A.  
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Education v. Rowley.158  That decision only applies to the issue of the 
adequacy of an IEP and was never intended to protect a district from 
an IEP challenge merely because the child is advancing from grade to 
grade.  To understand the scope of the Rowley decision, it is helpful 
to remember the facts.159 
Amy Rowley was born deaf.160  Before starting kindergarten, 
she knew sign language, as well as some lip reading.161  She began 
kindergarten shortly after Congress passed the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), and her parents were very 
committed to her receiving a public education with nondisabled 
children at the local public school rather than a school for the deaf, 
like her father had attended and where her mother had previously 
worked.162  The school system had some experience with the Rowley 
family before Amy started school and had even installed a teletype 
machine in the school office so they could call the Rowleys when 
issues arose involving their older child.163  Although the school 
district’s first response when contacted by the Rowleys may have 
been to suggest Amy attend the school for the deaf, it shifted gears 
pretty quickly when Amy’s parents suggested otherwise.164  The 
district contacted the state of New York to learn what kinds of 
services it should provide Amy so she could receive the education 
guaranteed by the EAHCA.165 
The Rowleys and the school district readily agreed on a range 
of services for Amy.166  For example, in first grade, she would 
                                                          
158 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
159 See generally Rowley Archives, ADA COORDINATOR’S OFFICE, THE 
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, available at http://ada.osu.edu/rowley (last visited Jan. 
11, 2013); Amy Rowley, 25 Years Later: Board of Education v. Rowley: A Look At 
The Past And Looking Towards The Future, Putting the Pieces Together: 
Proceedings of the PEPNet 2008 Conference, PEPNET (Apr. 15–18, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.pepnet.org/sites/default/files/91%20Conf%20proceedings%202008.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
160 Rowley, supra note 159, at 43. 
161 See Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
162 See Rowley, supra note 159, at 42–44. 
163 Id. at 44. 
164 Id. at 48. 
165 See Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
166 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982). 
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receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day 
and from a speech therapist for three hours per week.167  She would 
also receive use of a FM amplification device.168  Their point of 
disagreement stemmed over the issue of whether Amy should receive 
a sign language interpreter to facilitate communication between the 
teacher and Amy, and between Amy and the rest of the class.169 
Amy’s parents began pushing for Amy to receive sign 
language interpreter services beginning in kindergarten.170  When the 
school district communicated with the state about the need for such 
services, the state told the school district that such services were not 
necessary for a deaf child who had some lip-reading skills.171  
Nonetheless, Amy’s parents insisted that Amy receive such 
services.172 
In response to these parental requests, the school district 
agreed to conduct a trial with a sign language interpreter in February, 
while Amy was in kindergarten.173  The interpreter was supposed to 
assist Amy for four weeks and then the school district would evaluate 
the effectiveness of the services.174  Instead, the interpreter 
participated in the classroom for two weeks and suggested that the 
trial end because it was clear that Amy was not benefitting from the 
services.175  In an undated report, the interpreter noted that Amy 
“resisted” his attempts to interpret for her except during the story-
telling period for twenty minutes a day.176  The interpreter reported 
that Amy’s teacher used sign language sometimes and also used 
visual cues to indicate the “primary happenings” in the classroom 
(such as a request to lower their voices).177  Although the interpreter 
observed that Amy did “not get everything,” he also found that she 
                                                          
167 Id. 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 184–85. 
170 Rowley, supra note 159, at 44. 
171 See Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
172 See Rowley, supra note 159, at 44.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Evaluation by Jack Janik, Interpreter for weeks of February 27 to 
March 3, & March 6 to March 10, available in Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
177 Id. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
490 
would ask people to repeat information she had missed.178  He 
described her teacher as “one in a million.”179  He concluded:   
I would like to say that as far as interpretive services 
are concerned, they are not needed at this time.  
However, this does not rule out the fact that an 
interpreter will be needed at a future date when the 
classroom work becomes more involved and large 
group discussion becomes the rule.180 
The school district did not convene an IEP meeting to discuss 
these results until October of Amy’s first grade.181  Based on the fact 
that the district found Amy did not benefit from the interpreter 
services in kindergarten, the school committee members 
recommended that Amy receive the services “mandated by the state” 
and that they then “see how she continues to perform.”182  In other 
words, the Committee recommended that the school district institute 
a plan that conformed to the state minimum requirements for a deaf 
child, in light of the interpreter’s report, but reconsider that plan on a 
yearly basis in light of Amy’s evolving educational needs.  That view 
was consistent with the interpreter’s observation that an interpreter 
was not needed “at this time.”183  After all, she was only in 
kindergarten when the trial was conducted.184  No one was 
suggesting that Amy could be successfully educated throughout her 
schooling without an interpreter. 
When Amy’s parents filed for a due process hearing in 
October of Amy’s first grade year, the only issue was the validity of 
the IEP that had been written based on the information then available, 
including Amy’s aptitude and academic progress and the results of 
                                                          
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
182 District Committee on Handicapped Notes, dated October 3, 1978, 
available in Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
183 See supra text accompanying note 180. 
184 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
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the kindergarten trial.185  Based on this evidence, both the hearing 
officer and the New York Commission on Education concluded that 
Amy had received a “free appropriate public education” as required 
by the EAHCA.186  Relying on regulations promulgated to interpret a 
different statute (Section 504), the district court reversed, concluding 
that Amy was “not learning as much, or performing as well 
academically, as she would without her handicap . . .” because “she 
understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she could 
if she were not deaf.”187  Oddly, these findings were not connected to 
the service Amy requested—a sign language interpreter.  Based on 
the kindergarten trial, little evidence supported the conclusion that 
Amy would understand more and learn more if an interpreter were 
present.  In fact, her stubborn attempts to ignore the interpreter188 
(who actually frightened and annoyed her) supported the argument 
that her kindergarten interpreter hindered her educational progress. 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that it 
erred when it held that “the Act requires New York to maximize the 
potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the 
opportunity provided non-handicapped children.”189  The Court then 
went on to define what it thought Congress meant by a “free 
appropriate public education” (FAPE) if it did not require the 
“maximization” standard.190 
Before addressing the Court’s holding in Rowley, it is 
important to remember what the case was not about.  This case was 
not about whether the district conducted a proper evaluation to 
determine the scope of Amy’s disabilities.  This case was not about 
whether the district should have classified Amy as disabled.  
Nonetheless, hearing officers often cite Rowley when evaluating a 
school district’s compliance with its Child Find obligations.  That is 
an incorrect use of Rowley.  Even though a district need not 
“maximize” a child’s education, it does have the responsibility to 
                                                          
185 See Appendix E, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 
(No. 80-1002). 
186 Id. 
187 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 185 (1982). 
188 See Rowley Archives, supra note 159. 
189 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. 
190 Id. at 187–91. 
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make sure that a “child is assessed in all areas of suspected 
disability.”191   
Returning to how the Court defined the appropriate standard 
in Rowley as something lower than the “maximization” standard, it 
said that the State satisfied its FAPE requirement by 
 
providing personalized instruction with sufficient 
support services to permit the child to benefit 
educationally from that instruction.  Such 
instruction and services must be provided at public 
expense, must meet the State’s educational 
standards, must approximate the grade levels used 
in the State’s regular education, and must comport 
with the child’s IEP.  In addition, the IEP, and 
therefore the personalized instruction, should be 
formulated in accordance with the requirements of 
the Act and, if the child is being educated in the 
regular classrooms of the public education system, 
should be reasonably calculated to enable the child 
to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to 
grade.192 
 
The Court emphasized the importance of the “personalized 
instruction and related services.”193  It mentioned the “personalized 
instruction” twice within that paragraph.194  However, hearing 
officers often emphasize the “passing marks” passage rather than the 
“personalized instruction” passage.  The record of Amy receiving 
eight hours a week of individualized instruction and an FM system 
was very important to the Court concluding she was receiving an 
adequate IEP.  Had she not been receiving those additional services, 
it is unlikely that her record of advancing from grade-to-grade would 
have been sufficient to conclude that the IEP was adequate. 
Hearing officers should, therefore, not cite the “some 
educational benefit” from Rowley as if “some” is a ceiling.  Read in 
                                                          
191 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
192 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203–04. 
193 Id. at 210. 
194 Id. 
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context, the Court stated that a school district must offer at least 
“some” educational benefit because it would make no sense to have 
educational dollars flow to a school district and then have the child 
receive “no benefit from that education.”195  But the Court deleted the 
word “some” when it went on to describe the minimum level of 
educational benefit that must be provided.  It said that the “basic 
floor of opportunity” consists of “access to specialized instruction 
and related services which are individually designed to provide 
educational benefit to the handicapped child.”196  Again, as in the 
passage quoted above, the Court focused on the importance of access 
to “specialized instruction and related services.”197  Similarly, the 
sentence concerning the “basic floor of opportunity” from Rowley 
focuses on the importance of specialized instruction and related 
services.198  Hearing officers should not emphasize the term “basic” 
and ignore the need for specialized instruction and related services. 
The Rowley Court was careful not to define one educational 
standard that constitutes the “floor” for all children.  It stated: “We 
do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the 
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered 
by the Act.”199  Instead, the Court went on to apply the legal standard 
to the facts in Rowley.  The case was fairly easy under the applicable 
standard.  Not only was Amy receiving what the Court characterized 
as “substantial specialized instruction,”200 there was not even any 
strong evidence in the record that her performance in kindergarten or 
first grade would have been stronger had she had access to a sign 
language interpreter.  Further, the Court noted in an often-ignored 
footnote that: “We do not hold today that every handicapped child 
who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school is 
automatically receiving a ‘free appropriate public education.’”201  In 
this case, however, we find Amy’s academic progress, “when 
considered with the special services and professional consideration 
                                                          
195 Id. at 201. 
196 Id. 
197 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. 
198 Id. at 200.  
199 Id. at 202. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 203 n. 25. 
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accorded by the Furnace Woods school administrators, to be 
dispositive.”202  It would therefore be a misinterpretation of Rowley 
to emphasize grade-to-grade advancement rather than the scope of 
services being offered in determining whether an education is 
“adequate.”  
By the time Amy Rowley reached fifth grade, her parents had 
moved to a new school district that voluntarily agreed to provide her 
with a sign language interpreter as part of her free public 
education.203  Presumably, that district concluded that Amy could not 
attain adequate educational benefit without a sign language 
interpreter, given the greater difficulty of the academic material.  But 
that was not the record that the Rowley Court assessed.   
Congress’s amendments to the IDEA, subsequent to the 
Rowley decision, are consistent with a broad interpretation of 
Rowley’s educational benefit standard.  The IDEA’s current findings 
state that education for children with disabilities can be made more 
effective by “having high expectations for such children and ensuring 
their access to the general education curriculum in the regular 
classroom, to the maximum extent possible . . . .”204  Although 
Congress did not overrule Rowley by requiring an education to 
“maximize” a child’s potential, it has instructed school districts to 
raise its educational expectations for children with disabilities.  The 
Department of Education (“DOE”) has also codified the often-
ignored Rowley footnote with the statement that children can be 
classified as disabled under the IDEA (and therefore entitled to a 
FAPE) “even though they are advancing from grade to grade.”205  
Mere grade-to-grade advancement, under the language of Rowley or 
the DOE regulations, is therefore not sufficient evidence of a FAPE.  
The proper determination of FAPE can only be made on the basis of 
an individualized assessment of the specialized instruction and 
related services offered to the child in light of his or her disabilities. 
  
                                                          
202 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203 n. 25 (emphasis added). 
203 Rowley, supra note 159, at 50. 
204 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (2012). 
205 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(2) (2012). 
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B.   Mercer Island 
 
The Third and Sixth Circuits have interpreted the Rowley 
standard to support a “meaningful” educational benefit standard206 
under which one would measure educational benefit “in relation to 
the potential of the child at issue.”207  California hearing officers 
rarely, if ever, use the adjective “meaningful” to describe the amount 
of educational benefit that must be accorded under the IDEA in order 
for an IEP to be adequate because of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
J.L. v. Mercer Island School District.208  Thus, it makes sense to look 
at that case closely to see that it does not stand for a narrow reading 
of the “adequate educational benefit” standard in Rowley.   
Mercer Island was a case in which parents sought 
reimbursement for the expense of sending their child to a private, 
residential school in Massachusetts.209  After ten days of hearing, and 
re-argument in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer v. 
Weast, the hearing officer in Washington State allowed the parents to 
present some additional evidence and ruled for the Mercer Island 
School District.
210
  The complicated case involved a battle of the 
experts, in which the parents argued that their child was making little 
or no educational progress within the school district, and could only 
make adequate progress at the residential private school.211  By 
contrast, the school district argued that the child was making 
adequate educational progress and would not make better progress at 
the private school.212  The fundamental legal issue in the case was the 
meaning of an “adequate” education under Rowley, especially in light 
of the Supreme Court’s recent determination that the burden of proof 
                                                          
206 See, e.g., T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Township Bd. of Educ., 205 
F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
207 Deal, 392 F.3d at 862. 
208 575 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2009). 
209 Id. at 1030.  
210 In the Matter of Mercer Island Sch. Dist., Special Education Case, No. 
2005-SE-0078 (Jan. 20, 2006) (Mattie Harvin-Woode, ALJ), available at 
http://www.k12.wa.us/ProfPractices/adminresources/SpecEdFindings.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2013).  
211 See generally Mercer Island, 575 F.3d 1025.  
212 Id.  
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was on the parents to demonstrate that the education offered by the 
school district was inadequate.213  Because the Ninth Circuit had 
been placing the burden of proof on the school districts in such cases, 
this case was one of the first cases decided by the hearing officer 
under the new rules.
214
  The hearing officer cited Rowley and the 
post-Rowley cases to make the long-established point that the “school 
district is required by the statute and regulations to provide an 
appropriate education, not the best possible education, or the 
placement the parents prefer.”
215
 
The hearing officer only cited cases decided before 1997 in 
describing the meaning of the term “adequate education.”216  On 
appeal, the parents’ attorney emphasized language in the 1997 IDEA 
Amendments to argue that the school district did not offer their child 
an education that could lead to independent functioning because it set 
too low a standard for her reading and writing abilities.
217
  They 
never asked the court to rule that the 1997 Amendments had 
overturned Rowley, nor did they argue that the 1997 Amendments 
were a new statute.    
Unfortunately, the federal district court judge misunderstood 
the legislative history underlying the IDEA.218  She thought that the 
Education for Handicapped Children Act (EHCA) and the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act were different statutes, 
not realizing that Congress merely renamed the EHCA to IDEA in 
1990 to conform to the language used in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.219  Thus, she mistakenly concluded that Congress 
overturned the Rowley decision through enactment of the 1997 
version of the IDEA.220  Citing to the findings for the 1997 Act, she 
                                                          
213 Id. at 1027.  
214 In the Matter of Mercer Island Sch. Dist., supra note 210, at 47. 
215 Id. at 57. 
216 See generally id.  
217 Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief, J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist., No. 2:06-
cv-00494-MJP (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.harborhouselaw.com/law/plead/wa.mercer.brief.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 
2013).  
218 J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist., No. CO6-494P, 2006 WL 3628033 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006). 
219 Id. at *4.  
220 Id. 
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says that those findings are “such a significant departure from the 
previous legislative scheme that any citation to pre-1997 case law on 
special education is suspect.”221  That statement was simply wrong, 
because there is no statement in the legislative history that indicates 
that Congress was overturning Rowley through any of its 
Amendments to the EHCA or IDEA.222  The courts never conclude 
that Congress impliedly overturns Supreme Court interpretations of 
statutes.  Because the district court judge was so wrong on the 
appropriate legal standard, the court of appeals had to reverse her 
decision.223 
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Mercer Island.  The Ninth Circuit recognized 
that there has been some inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit on the 
issue of how to define the required educational benefit but said that 
the “educational benefit,” “some educational benefit” and 
“meaningful” educational benefit standards all “refer to the same 
standard.”224  Thus, it did not disavow the approach taken in the 
Third and Sixth Circuits where the “meaningful” educational 
standard is dominant, but also recognized that it was wrong to 
interpret the 1997 IDEA Amendments as overturning Rowley.225  No 
other circuit has held that Congress has overturned Rowley, and the 
Ninth Circuit would have been on weak ground if it had agreed with 
the district court judge on that point.  But it is also wrong to interpret 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision as invalidating the “meaningful” 
educational standard approach. 
A good example of a correct application of the “meaningful” 
educational progress standard can be found in the California ALJ 
opinion in Parents v. Bellflower Unified School District.226  This 
complicated case involved a child, “Edward,” who was originally 
classified as having a speech and language impairment but was 
                                                          
221 Id. 
222 See COLKER, supra note 6, at 93–103.  
223 See J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist., 592 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2010). 
224 Id. at 951 n. 10. 
225 Id. at 951.  
226 Parents ex rel. Student v. Bellflower Unified School District, OAH 
Case No. 2009080509 (Jan. 26, 2010) (Peter Paul Castillo, ALJ), 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2009080509.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Bellflower ALJ Opinion]. 
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actually autistic with a significant cognitive impairment.227  During 
the time period when Edward was only classified as having a speech 
and language impairment, he was receiving a 30-minute speech and 
language session, two times a week, in a small group with two to 
three students.228  Despite receiving these intensive services, the 
school district’s speech and language pathologist determined that his 
receptive language was in the second percentile, and his auditory 
comprehension was in the seventh percentile.  The ALJ opinion 
reported that Edward had “progressed” with respect to his receptive 
language since his initial assessment about a year earlier; his auditory 
comprehension increased from a standard score of 71 in October 
2006 to a 77 in February 2008.229  With respect to his expressive 
speech, the school district’s speech and language pathologist reported 
that Edward scored in the first percentile;230 the ALJ found that this 
score reflected that he did not fall further behind his peers despite a 
record of numerous absences from school.231  Despite this report, the 
school district recommended reducing Edward’s speech and language 
therapy to fifty minutes per week, kept his original goals, and did not 
recommend any individual speech and language sessions.232  The 
school district only agreed to increase the speech and language 
therapy to seventy-five minutes, including fifty minutes of individual 
therapy, after his parents obtained a private evaluation about six 
months later. 
While recognizing that Edward did not fall further behind his 
peers with respect to expressive speech and made some minor 
improvement in receptive speech, the ALJ concluded that he had not 
made “meaningful” progress during this time period.233  The ALJ 
concluded that the school district had “failed to provide Student with 
sufficient speech and language services to permit Student to make 
meaningful educational progress until the District increased these 
                                                          
227 See generally id.  The hearing officer opinion does not provide a name 
for the child.  I have called him “Edward” to humanize the record. 
228 Id. at 19. 
229 Id. at 21. 
230 Id. at 20. 
231 Id. at 21. 
232 Id. at 20. 
233 Id. at 41. 
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services.”234  The evidence in this case that the school district had not 
provided appropriate speech and language services was so strong that 
the school district conceded, on appeal, that the student needed 
individual sessions.235  It only defended the change from sixty 
minutes to fifty minutes, arguing that there was no showing of harm 
from a ten-minute per week reduction in services.236  Although the 
parents had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the IEP was 
inadequate, the district court judge affirmed the ALJ decision in 
favor of the parents, in part, because the school district offered no 
evidence at the IEP meeting or in court as to why it reduced the 
services for a child who was already not making meaningful 
progress.237  Thus, the district court judge correctly interpreted 
Schaffer v. Weast in not imposing an overly harsh burden of proof on 
the parents.  The combination of a correct reading of the definition of 
an adequate educational plan and the parents’ burden of proof 
resulted in a favorable decision for Edward. 
Although Edward’s parents prevailed in this case, it is 
important to notice the considerable efforts they had to employ in 
order to obtain a successful outcome.  They challenged the school 
district’s proposed IEP, brought a due process complaint, and then 
defended the successful ALJ opinion on appeal to the district 
court.238  They needed to pursue this multi-year process in order to 
prevent the school district from reducing the services being provided 
to a child who was making virtually no academic progress.  They 
hired a lawyer and obtained a private evaluation to contest the school 
district’s actions.239  One can imagine that many parents would not 
have the resources to challenge a school district’s conduct in such a 
case.  
 
                                                          
234 Id. 
235 Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist. v. Velez ex rel. E.V., No. CV 10-1065-
GHK (RCx), 9 (C.D. Cal. March 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2009080509%20USDC%20
minutes.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Bellflower District Court 
Opinion]. 
236 Id. at 10. 
237 Id. 
238 See id. 
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IV.   REMEDIES FOR PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
 
The final, important problem that is worthy of extensive 
discussion is the grounds upon which an ALJ can grant relief when a 
procedural error has occurred.  The regulations provide that: 
 
In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing 
officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE 
only if the procedural inadequacies—  
(i) Impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; 
(ii) Significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process 
regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s 
child; or 
(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.240 
The regulations do not require a finding that a procedural 
violation led to a denial of FAPE; they merely say that a hearing 
officer may find that the procedural violation led to a denial of a 
FAPE.241  Because of the discretion that appellate courts must give to 
hearing officer decisions, it is therefore not surprising that hearing 
officers need not worry that their discretionary decision will often be 
overturned on appeal.  Nonetheless, the reluctance of hearing officers 
to conclude that a procedural violation resulted in the denial of a 
FAPE is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in both 
Rowley and Schaffer on the importance of procedural compliance to 
the IDEA.  In order for California hearing officers to start to 
determine that procedural violations have resulted in a denial of a 
FAPE, it would be helpful to know what kinds of procedural 
inadequacies have led other courts to determine there was a denial of 
FAPE.  Three examples are discussed below.  Two of the examples 
are from California cases in which the district court judge overruled 
the ALJ because the ALJ failed to conclude that the procedural 
violation caused a denial of FAPE.  
 
                                                          
240 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(2) (2012). 
241 Id. 
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A.   Impeded the Child’s Right to a FAPE 
 
A good example of a procedural problem impeding a child’s 
right to a FAPE can be found in Edward’s case against the Bellflower 
Unified School District in which both the ALJ and the district court 
judge concluded that the procedural violations resulted in a denial of 
FAPE.242  This is a case in which the School District made many 
errors, including the unilateral reduction in the amount of speech and 
language services.243  Because the school district could offer no 
explanation for this reduction, the error caused Edward not to receive 
a FAPE.244  Another error was that the school district did not test 
Edward for autism until his parents provided them with a 
comprehensive assessment suggesting autism.245  The ALJ found in 
favor of the parents on this issue even though the school district had a 
basis for not testing for autism—that the parents kept insisting that 
they did not believe their child was autistic even after their 
pediatrician had diagnosed Edward as autistic.246  The ALJ found that 
the pediatrician’s diagnosis coupled with Edward’s display of 
behaviors that were consistent with an autism diagnosis should have 
triggered an autism assessment by the school district.247  The ALJ 
found that the school district had the obligation to assess Edward in 
all areas of suspected disability irrespective of the parents’ beliefs 
about the appropriate diagnosis.248  Further, the ALJ found that the 
failure to assess Edward with respect to autistic-like behaviors 
“denied him a FAPE,” because his existing IEP did not take into 
account his full set of disabilities.249 
The district court judge agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that 
the school district failed to assess Edward for special education 
services related to autism.250  But the judge also followed the 
                                                          
242 See Bellflower ALJ Opinion, supra note 226; Bellflower District Court 
Opinion, supra note 235. 
243 Bellflower ALJ Opinion, supra note 226, at 41. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 7–8. 
246 Id. at 11–12.  
247 Id. at 37–38. 
248 Id. at 37. 
249 Id. at 38. 
250 Bellflower District Court Opinion, supra note 235, at 4. 
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statutory requirements more closely and specifically found that this 
procedural error caused a loss of educational opportunity by 
substantively denying Edward a FAPE.251  The judge said:   
Although the ALJ did not explicitly conduct this 
harmless error analysis for determining whether the 
failure to assess denied Student a FAPE, his 
subsequent conclusions that Student’s February 2008 
and March 2009 IEPs substantively denied him a 
FAPE are tantamount to a finding that the failure to 
assess was not harmless.  We agree with these factual 
findings, and we conclude that the District’s failure to 
assess resulted in the loss of educational 
opportunity.252 
This clarification by the district court judge is relatively 
minor but, from a precedential standpoint, is helpful to lawyers who 
are looking for cases in which an express finding of educational harm 
from a procedural error has occurred.  Thus, it is fortunate that the 
judge clarified the legal issues.  This case can serve as a model for 
the kind of case in which a procedural error can give rise to a 
remedial order—a failure to identify a disability can result in an 
inappropriate educational plan. 
 
B.   Denied an Opportunity to Meaningfully Participate 
 
The denial of an opportunity to participate meaningfully is an 
issue frequently raised by parents because of their sense that the 
school district  predetermined the IEP without considering the 
available evidence.  This feeling of frustration may be particularly 
commonplace in California because school districts seem to often 
combine the eligibility meeting with the IEP meeting.  Because 
school personnel have only a limited amount of time to attend an IEP 
meeting, one would expect that this process leads to rushed meetings 
at which parents may not feel like they can offer sufficient input. 
                                                          
251 Id. at 5–6. 
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An example of a case from the Los Angeles Unified School 
District, J.P. v. Los Angeles Unified School District,253 where this 
combined eligibility/IEP model was used, can show how it can cause 
harm to the child, especially when important issues are not resolved 
at the sole IEP meeting that is scheduled.  The ALJ’s opinion was 
overturned by the district court, also showing how difficult it can be 
for parents to enforce their rights.254  They may need to go through 
two stages of a multi-year process to attain justice. 
This case involved a boy, who I will call “John,” who had 
attended second through sixth grade at a private school.255  Despite 
having high cognitive aptitude, John was struggling in school and 
having quite significant difficulties with social interactions.256  Based 
on the advice of the private psychologist they had hired, his parents 
decided to contact the school district for assistance in educating their 
son.257  An eligibility/IEP meeting was held on June 10, 2008 at 
which the team agreed that John was eligible for special education in 
the autism category.258  The school district agreed to send John’s 
parents a list of three schools to consider for their son in the fall 
because the IEP team had agreed that he needed to attend a nonpublic 
school.259  The IEP would not be finalized until the parents visited 
the proposed schools.260  Although the district usually takes two 
weeks to send the potential list to the parents, it did not send the list 
                                                          
253 Case No. CV 09-01083 MMM (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.californiaspecialedlaw.com/wiki/appeals/jp-v-lausd.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
254 Id. at 65. 
255 Id. at 2. 
256 Id. at 3. 
257 Id. 
258 Id.  at 16.  See also generally Parents ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified 
Sch. Dist., OAH Case No. 2008080771 (Nov. 7, 2008) (Glynda B. Gomez, ALJ),  
available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2008080771.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013). 
259 Id. at 16. 
260 J.P. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 253, at 18. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
504 
until August 6, 2008.261  It did not communicate with John’s parents 
about the names of the schools that would go on that list.262 
The three schools were not in session when John’s mother 
received this information in August.263  She reviewed information 
about two of the schools online and decided they were not 
acceptable.264  In one school, John would have been the only seventh 
grader, and the emphasis of the school seemed to be behavior.265  In 
the other school, 53% of the students had been designated as 
emotionally disturbed.266  John’s mother attended an open house 
informational session at the third school.267  She also visited the 
school twice and concluded it was not appropriate for John because 
the principal discouraged the use of computers, the students appeared 
to have severe social problems, and her son was more high 
functioning than the other children in the program.268  She sent a 
letter to the school district informing it that she would enroll her son 
at a private school not on their list—Bridges Academy—because of 
her disagreement with the appropriateness of the educational 
programs suggested by the school district.269  After receiving that 
letter, the district sent a letter to John’s parents identifying a single, 
appropriate placement (after the school year had already begun).270  
The person who sent that letter had not participated in the IEP 
meeting.271  The letter provided no explanation for the district’s 
decisions.272 
At the due process hearing, John’s parents argued that the 
school district had not allowed them to meaningfully participate in 
the selection of a school because the IEP never identified a specific 
program, and the list of potential schools did not arrive until a few 
                                                          
261 Id. at 21, 22. 
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264 Id. at 24. 
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weeks before the beginning of the school year.273  The school district, 
by contrast, argued that the parents did not participate in good 
faith.274  They had paid a non-refundable tuition to a private school 
before receiving the list of schools from the district in August.275  
The school district argued that the parents “were merely seeking 
funding for a placement choice that they had made prior to the IEP 
meeting.”276  The hearing officer ruled for the district, concluding 
that it was not a procedural failure for the school district to fail to 
make a specific offer of placement in a timely fashion.277   
The district court overruled the hearing officer, finding that 
the school district’s actions precluded John’s parents from 
meaningfully participating in the process.278  The district court judge 
identified the following problems: 
· Only a single IEP meeting occurred; there was no evidence of 
any meaningful discussion of placement options at that time.279 
· The August letter was sent by a district employee who did not 
participate in the IEP meeting.280 
· No final IEP meeting was ever convened to justify the 
September, single-offer placement letter.  The person who wrote 
that letter had not attended the June IEP meeting.281 
· The multiple-placement offer placed an undue burden on the 
parent to ferret out potentially inappropriate placements, which 
infringes on the parents’ right to participate.282 
· The school district failed to provide a formal, written offer (even 
by the time the ALJ rendered her decision).283 
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The difference of opinion between the ALJ and the district 
court judge seems to involve the issue of the parents’ good faith.  The 
hearing officer seemed willing to allow the district to offer the 
parents less opportunity to participate because of their supposed 
determination to send their child to a specific private school.284   
The hearing officer’s decision is surprising in light of the 
testimony that the parents’ lawyer elicited from the school district 
representative who sent the August and September letters about 
school placement options.285  The school district representative 
testified: 
that she had not followed district policy that required 
that she collaborate with the parents, provide support 
to the parents in making a selection, arrange visits to 
the [private] options, and explain to the parents the 
intake and admissions procedures at the potential 
[private] placements . . . [she also] conceded that a 
seven-week delay in receiving an offer of placement 
was an unusually long amount of time.286 
Oddly, the school district claimed that it was not aware of the 
parents’ determination to send their child to another private school 
during the time when it was stalling to put together an offer of a 
placement.287  So, its explanation for providing the parents a lack of 
an opportunity to participate was a post hoc explanation.  Thus, if 
that process was typical for the School District, the District Court 
judge’s ruling should help guide the School District prospectively 
with respect to how it works with parents to select an appropriate 
school placement.  The district court judge was very clear: “the error 
was not technical, the error was not harmless, and J.P.’s parents were 
prejudiced.”288  But it took a multi-year process for the parents to 
finally prevail on appeal. 
 
                                                          
284 Parents v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 258, at 19. 
285 J.P. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 253, at 62. 
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C.   Caused a Deprivation of Educational Benefit 
 
This category is similar to the first category except that it 
tends to apply when a child is not even on an IEP due to the school 
district’s procedural errors.  Thus, the child is not able to receive the 
kind of educational benefits that would be available under an IEP. 
A 2009 California case provides an example of when 
procedural errors caused a deprivation of educational benefits.289  
Due to academic and behavioral problems in school, the school 
district held eligibility meetings in February 2005, June 2006, and 
December 2006.290  At each meeting, the district concluded that 
“William” was ineligible for special education services.291  
Meanwhile, William repeated first grade; a Section 504 plan was put 
in place for William under which he was only expected to complete 
50% of class work, and a behavior plan was also put in place.292  
Even with these rules in place, he completed about half of the 
required work (or 25% of the work altogether).293  In particular, he 
very much disliked writing and completed few writing 
assignments.294 
William’s parents thought he had ADHD and a writing 
impairment and that these impairments were having an adverse effect 
on his educational performance.295  They filed a due process 
complaint on June 20, 2007, at the end of his third grade.296  The ALJ 
ruled that the school district had complied with its Child Find 
obligations and that, even if William had a specific learning disability 
                                                          
289 See W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV F 08-0374 
LJO DLB, 2009 WL 1605356 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2009) [hereinafter Clovis District 
Court Opinion].  See also Student v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., OAH Case No. N 
2007060634, at 6 (Dec. 17, 2007) (Debra Huston, ALJ), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2007060634.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Clovis ALJ Opinion]. 
290 Clovis District Court Opinion, supra note 289, at *3. 
291 Id.  The child’s name is not in the court’s opinion.  I have given him a 
name to humanize the discussion. 
292 Id. at *2. 
293 Id. 
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295 Id. at *2. 
296 See id. at *3. 
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or other health impairment, he did not need special education and 
related services.297  William’s parents appealed that determination, 
and a district court judge reversed the ALJ, in part, in a decision on 
June 8, 2009, at the end of William’s fifth grade.298  The district court 
judge ruled that the “[d]istrict failed to assess Student in the area of 
writing and failed [to provide Student a FAPE based on its failure to 
identify him] as eligible for special education and related services 
under the category of [Other Health Impairment].”299  The procedural 
ground for relief was the deprivation of an education benefit (IEP) 
caused by a failure to identify William as disabled.300  Unlike the 
category one case involving Edward, the school district was not 
following an existing IEP; the procedural violations caused William 
not to have an IEP at all.  A close examination of the record shows 
how difficult it is for parents to have the necessary “firepower” to 
win this kind of case.   
William was identified as having ADHD in 2003, prior to 
beginning first grade at a public elementary school within his school 
district.301  He repeated first grade so he attended first grade in both 
2003–2004 and in 2004–2005.302  The school district first assessed 
William in January and February of 2005 and held an eligibility 
meeting on February 22, 2005.303  The team determined that William 
was not eligible for special education and related services because he 
was making adequate progress in the regular classroom, but it also 
convened a Section 504 meeting (with the same group of people) and 
created an accommodation plan for him.304    
The February 2005 evaluation indicated that William received 
a standard score of 79 on the visual motor-integration evaluation, 
placing him in the
 
sixth percentile.305  Although that score could have 
been the basis for the conclusion that he had a learning disability in 
                                                          
297 Id. 
298 See id. at *25–26. 
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writing, the school psychologist concluded that his writing problems 
were “behaviorally based” because he simply refused to write.306  
The February 2005 evaluation also indicated that William had a 
standard score of 83, which is the thirteenth percentile, on a test of 
working memory.307  Although a low working memory score can be 
an indication that a student’s ADHD is having an adverse educational 
effect, the school district did not consider that score sufficient to 
qualify William as disabled under IDEA.308  The February 2005 
evaluation also included an assessment in the area of 
social/emotional functioning.309  These scores reportedly placed 
William in the “at risk” range with respect to adaptive skills, 
depression and hyperactivity.310  William’s parents’ expert testified at 
the due process hearing that there were numerous scoring errors with 
this instrument, and the ALJ observed: “Overall, [the school 
psychologist] did not know what the difference in Student’s BASC 
scores would be in the absence of the errors.”311  Despite these low 
scores, significant behavioral problems in the classroom, and errors 
in reporting test results, the ALJ concluded that the school district 
had no obligation to evaluate William for a behavioral disability prior 
to April 2006.312   
The ALJ opinion does not describe William’s Section 504 
plan but the district court opinion states that, under the Section 504 
plan, William was only required to complete 50% of the schoolwork 
assigned during the 2005–2006 school year (second grade).313  
Despite this accommodation, he only completed 50% of his 
accommodated work—in other words, he was completing about 25% 
of the work assigned to the second grade class.314  Because William 
was struggling with writing, the Section 504 team met in October 
                                                          
306 Id. at 9. 
307 Id. at 11. 
308 Id. at 3.  
309 Id. at 46. 
310 Id. at 11–12. 
311 Id. at 12 n. 8. 
312 Id. at 13. 
313 Clovis District Court Opinion, supra note 289, at *2. 
314 Id. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
510 
2005 to discuss whether William had a written language disorder.315  
Rather than suggesting testing to determine if William had a 
language disorder, the team relied on his second grade teacher’s 
report that he was “probably at grade level” based on the few writing 
projects that William would complete.316 
Meanwhile, William began having behavioral problems.  He 
was behaving aggressively towards other children, having tantrums 
in class, and not completing class work.  The school district put in 
place a behavior support plan in February 2006; the support plan 
stated that his behaviors were interfering with his learning.317  The 
school district began to suggest to William’s parents that William 
might qualify as eligible for special education under the category of 
“emotional disturbance.”318 
The school district agreed to assess William for special 
education eligibility in April 2006,319 but its assessment plan was 
quite incomplete because it was based on the assumption that his 
problems in school were primarily due to an emotional disturbance.  
Thus, the school district did not assess William for a deficit in visual-
motor integration despite the low score from the 2005 assessment in 
that area.  Nonetheless, a private psychologist had administered a 
visual-motor integration test to William in November 2005, and he 
had obtained a standard score of 85, within the average range.320  
Based on these test results, the ALJ concluded (and the district court 
affirmed) that the district “had no reason to suspect that Student had a 
disability in the area of visual-motor integration . . . .”321  
Unfortunately, this conclusion confuses the issue of whether there is 
any reason to “suspect” a disability with the substantive result after 
such an evaluation is completed.  The change in William’s standard 
score from 79 to 85 is likely within the confidence interval for the 
standard error of measurement of the testing instrument.322  An 85 is 
                                                          
315 Id. at *16. 
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317 Clovis ALJ Opinion, supra note 289, at 8–9. 
318 Id. at 9. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 10. 
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322 See generally Technical Assistance Paper: Standard Error of 
Measurement (SEm), BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUCATION AND STUDENT 
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exactly one standard deviation below the mean (100) and is barely 
within what can be called the “average” range.  Later tests may have 
concluded that William did not have a visual-motor disability, but the 
legal question should have been whether there was any reason to 
suspect that William had a visual-motor deficit in April 2006 when 
the school district agreed to conduct additional testing.  And such 
evidence did exist from both the scores of 79 and 85 within the last 
six months. 
The April 2006 evaluation did include an attempt to evaluate 
William’s writing.323  One reason for not conducting this assessment 
until that time was that he was receiving grades of A and B in his 
classes;324 but that observation ignored that he was only completing 
about 25% of the class work.  In fact, William was producing very 
little writing in class.325  The scope of his writing problems should 
have triggered an evaluation before April 2006. 
The writing evaluation that was conducted as part of the April 
2006 assessment was woefully incomplete.  The school district’s 
resource specialist tried to get William to produce a writing sample in 
May 2006 but was unable to do so.326  The school district primarily 
based its evaluation of William’s writing abilities on his average 
score of 104 from the Woodcock-Johnson assessment, but that 
assessment did not require William to produce any sustained writing; 
it only required him to fill in the blanks and write simple 
sentences.327  The school district also had one piece of writing that 
William had produced at school on a favorite topic and with 
tremendous assistance from the school psychologist328—a three-
paragraph, nine-sentence writing sample describing his favorite 
Pokémon character.329 
The ALJ explained why she considered it appropriate for the 
school district not to conduct a thorough writing assessment in the 
                                                          
SERVICES, available at http://www.fldoe.org/ese/pdf/y1996-7.pdf (last visited Jan. 
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fall of 2006 and spring of 2007.  She placed weight on William’s 
proficient score on the spring 2007 STAR exam330 even though that 
exam was exclusively a fill-in-the-bubble examination, did not 
require students to write,331 and was taken under conditions of 
accommodation.  She also placed much weight on the Pokémon 
writing sample that she described as having been written “without 
any help,”332 ignoring the extensive assistance offered by the school 
psychologist to get him to complete that piece of writing.333  Finally, 
she ignored the evidence that William’s writing had deteriorated even 
further in third grade because he “rarely produced written work in the 
classroom.”334  Despite the absence of much evidence that William 
could produce grade-level writing, the ALJ credited testimony from 
the school psychologist that William was “capable” of doing grade-
level work and that his failure to complete work was “his choice.”335   
The district court judge was quite critical of the ALJ’s 
determination that William’s difficulties in writing were simply a 
result of his “choice.”336  That conclusion ignored evidence that 
William would “freeze up” or “shut down” when he tried to write and 
that he often could not even write on a topic that he enjoyed 
greatly.337  Similarly, it ignored his mother’s testimony that he could 
not write even if he wanted to do so.  The district court judge 
concluded:  “At best, Student’s ability to write was inconsistent and 
based partly on his behavior.  For these reasons, writing expression 
was an area of suspected disability for Student, and District’s child 
find obligation was triggered at the beginning of the relevant time 
period and continued throughout.”338 
One reason that the ALJ and the district court reached 
different conclusions about the adequacy of the writing evaluation is 
that they gave different weight to William’s expert’s testimony.  
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William’s expert, Dr. Patterson, testified that William was unable to 
sustain writing effort.339  The ALJ discredited Patterson’s testimony 
because he was unaware of the Pokémon writing sample and had not 
spoken with William’s teachers or observed William in the 
classroom.340  These are the same kinds of errors that the Los 
Angeles School District raised in the case involving Kathleen—they 
criticized Kathleen’s expert for not having personally tested her in a 
case involving the adequacy of the school district’s evaluation.341  
But in a case involving the adequacy of the school district’s 
evaluation—where the parents are seeking an independent 
educational evaluation or a violation of the district’s child-find 
obligations, the parent’s expert need not have evaluated the child at 
all.  The parent’s expert can merely review the testing done by the 
school district.  In William’s case, the expert did conduct an 
extensive evaluation of William and concluded he had ADHD and a 
disorder of written expression.342  But William’s parents should have 
been able to prevail merely by attacking the school district’s sloppy 
evaluation rather than conducting an evaluation of their own.  Hence, 
the district court concluded: 
[t]he testimony of every witness supported Dr. 
Patterson’s expert opinion that Student is unable to 
sustain writing effort.  Thus, Student’s single writing 
sample does not negate Dr. Patterson’s professional 
opinion, even if he was unaware of it.  In evaluating 
Student’s written expression, District ignored the 
undisputed evidence that Student rarely produced 
written work in the classroom.  The overwhelming 
and consistent testimony from all witnesses is that 
Student is impaired in written expression, sustained 
writing, and the initiation of writing.343 
The district court judge was correct to conclude that the 
school district had sufficient evidence of William’s writing 
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difficulties to justify a full writing assessment.  But William’s 
witnesses need not have proved that William was actually impaired 
in written expression to justify an assessment.  The district court’s 
discussion confuses the question of whether an assessment should 
occur with the issue of whether the child is actually disabled.   
Although William’s parents eventually prevailed on this issue 
in the district court, it is important to emphasize how difficult it was 
for them to prevail.  They filed the due process complaint on June 20, 
2007 after more than two years of pressing the school district to 
identify their child as having a disorder in written expression.344  
Their original due process hearing was scheduled for August 28, 
2007, but they had to ask for a continuance because they could not 
get Dr. Patterson to evaluate William until August 25, 2007.345  The 
due process hearing was rescheduled for September 13, 2007, but 
William’s parents were not able to use Dr. Patterson as an expert at 
that time because they had not yet shared his report with the school 
district.346  They had to ask for another continuance until October 15, 
2007 so that they could share his report.347     
The ALJ issued a decision in favor of the school district on 
December 17, 2007, about six months after William’s parents filed 
their due process complaint.348  That decision was not overturned 
until June 8, 2009, when he would have completed fifth grade.349  
And the district court merely remanded the case back to the ALJ.350  
It is quite possible that William did not receive special education 
services in the area of writing for third, fourth, and fifth grades based 
on the ALJ’s decision from 2007. 
Nonetheless, the case reflects the district court (but not the 
ALJ) concluding that the “failure to assess Student in his writing, 
including determining all aspects of Student’s difficulty with written 
expression, deprived Student of educational benefits”351—the third 
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type of procedural error for which one can get relief under the IDEA.  
But, as with other cases discussed above, the parents only prevailed 
after pursuing a multi-year litigation process. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
In California, as in many other jurisdictions that I examined, 
it is very difficult for parents to prevail at a due process hearing.  
Hearing officers impose a high burden of proof on parents and 
construe Rowley so as to make it very difficult to challenge the 
adequacy of an IEP.  School districts in California also seem to be 
quite litigious, even challenging the child’s right to an Independent 
Education Evaluation.  I hope that closer attention to the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Schaffer and Rowley, along with closer 
consideration of situations in which relief can be ordered based on 
procedural violations, will cause parents to have a better chance of 
prevailing in California and elsewhere in the future. 
